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1INTRODUCTION
Historical Background
As part of an expanding concern for cognitive psychology,
an interest in imagery as an effective symbolic process has
ensued. Images and words can be considered as two alternative
representations of events, objects or language. Imaginal
mediation can be differentiated from verbal mediation by
the absence of direct use of words. Drawing specifically
on suggestions by Paivio (1971, p. 12), an image can be defined
as a nonverbal, spatial or temporal memory code, which
represents perception. To the degree that visual imagery
is analogous to visual perception, imaginal processing
presumably involves parallel processing of information.
"Processing" in this sense refers to that which occurs
at storage as well as at retrieval. Verbal processing
is functionally linked to the auditory sensory modality and
therefore involves sequential processing of information.
This is in part due to the syntactic organization of
most verbal material and the characteristic left-to-right
scanning involved in reading. In contrast, William
James (1899) specified that "an imaginal object, however
complex, is at any one moment thought in one idea,
which is aware of all its qualities together."
The notion of imagery is not new. William James
included a chapter on imagination in his book published in
1899, The Principles of Psychology . He spoke of images
as "copies" of sensations that arise after the original
stimulus is gone. James even tried to identify a
physiological basis of imagery. Soon afterward, reverber
ations from J.B.Watson's statement, "The action is the
meaning," were picked up by Titchener (1911) who wrote,
"...it takes at least two sensations to make a meaning...
kinaesthesis and verbal images." Bartlett (1932) handled
the function of imagery more specifically— "imagining
Consists essentially in the utilization of experiences
which are no longer fully presented to perceptual sensorv
organs, and such utilization is a part of all remembering
processes." This assertion has recently become a source
of considerable attention in the area of cognitive
research
.
Two Empirical Approaches
The study of imagery has been approached two ways
.
The first involves imagery-mediating instructions. In
this method, subjects are usually presented noun pairs
or a list of nouns with or without instructions to form
a mental picture of the objects names. 'Hie effects of
imagery instructions increase recall when the nouns are
concrete (Kirkpatrick , 1894- Bower, Lesgold, Tieman, 1959
Schnorr and Atkinson, 1969), but do not facilitate recall
for abstract (low-imagery value) noun-verb pairs (Cuntcn
and Frincke
, 1970). This approach to studying imagery
seems somewhat contrived. The primary role of imagerv.
per se,is not actually being measured, but instead it
is the effect of inserting imagery as a supplementary
memory code that is being manipulated.
This paper will primarily be concerned with a second
approach to studying imagery. With this method, character-
istics of the to-be-remembered materials which seem to
correlate with ease of imagining are varied, and then
measures are taken of the effect on recall. An extensive
program of research initiated bv Paivio lias been instrumental
in specifying the function of imagery in a wav that can
be integrated into a general memory theory. Of particular
interest in this paper is the function of imagery in
learning sentences
.
Background of Specific Exper iments
In recent years an interest in the effects of imagery
on learning prose materials has arisen. A study by ^onni
and Lachman (1967) reflects this interest. In their study,
Pompi and Lachman presented subjects with 79 words , one
word at a time . The words were organized syntactically
as a paragraph, or they were randomly organized. After
one exposure to the entire set of 7 9 words . the sub j ect
s
received a recognition test . In the recognition test the
previously learned words were interspersed among 150
distractor words which were thematically associated with
the test words (high TA) or not thematically associated
(low TA) . Thematic association refers to the liklihood
that a word is conceptually related to the theme of a
given passage, Two results of this study are relevant.
First, regardless of other manipulations, the mean
number of words correctly recognized was higher for
syntactically organized materials than for those presented
randomly. Second, an interaction between word order
(random or syntactic) and level of TA was obtained using
measures of both recall and recognition. More false
positive responses were recorded for the high TA distractors
than for the low TA distractors following the syntactically
ordered paragraph, but the difference was not significant
with random order presentation. The implication is that
when possible, information is stored as some type of
"surrogate structure" (image, semantic core, etc.). This
could explain the interaction between word order and level
of TA. Utilization of a surrogate structure was only
feasible with the syntactically organized material,
supported by the high false positive recognition rate for
this condition. Additionally, storage in the form of a
surrogate structure improved the recall of subjects who were
presented syntactically organized materials.
A result interpreted as a facilitative effect of
imagery storage was also reported by Dooling and Lachrnan (1971).
In their study they manipulated presentation or non-presentation
of a thematic title prior ro reading a concrete 7 7 word
paragraph. prior presentation of the thematic title
resulted in superior recall, with the effect increasing
5with higher syntactic constraint. As word order approached
prose form, the effect of prefamiliarization with the
theme of the material increased. Again, the results can
be interpreted in terms of storing information in memory
in the form of an imaginal representation which summarizes
the meaning of the material and facilitates retention
of prose material.
The effect of imagery on the storage of less concrete
materials was approached by Yuille and Paivio (1967).
They applied a mediational-latency paradigm to subjects
learning concrete or abstract materials. Instructions
encouraged the subjects to link the noun pairs usinp
either imaginal or verbal mediators. The amount of time
that it took each subject to determine when he had linked
the noun pairs using the specified type of mediator was
recorded. These latency measures varied with concreteness
under imagery mediation but not under verbal mediation.
That is, imagery mediation took significantly longer than
verbal mediation with the abstract materials whereas
type of mediation did not affect the response latency
with concrete materials. In a similar study, Paivio and
Begg (1970) presented both abstract and concrete sentences
to subjects and instructed half of the subjects to indicate
when they had "imaged" each sentence; the other half were
instructed to indicate when they had "comprehended" each
sentence. Again, the amount of time that it took subjects
6to image or comprehend each sentence was recorded. Usinn
these latency measures, an interaction between mean
comprehension and imagery latencies for abstract and
concrete sentences was obtained, with the longer latency
of "imaging" over "comprehending'' more marked with the
abstract than the concrete sentences.
More specific to the approach to imagery studies
discussed in this paper, is a study bv Yuille and naivio
(1969). Subjects were presented 79 word paragraphs which
were at one of three levels of abstractness (abstract,
concrete or moderately concrete). The level of abstractness
was arrived at on the basis of prior subject rating.
Although each paragraph was a description of a concrete
scene, the abstractness of the individual words was
varied for each level of abstractness. In addition, the
words in these paragraphs were organized syntactically or
randomly. Each subject was presented one paragraph, one
word at a time. At the end of the presentation, four
minutes were allowed to recall the words in any order.
This procedure was then repeated for trial two. The results
suggested that with syntactic order, recall improved with
increasing concreteness . However, the degree of abstractness
did not affect recall of the randomly presented material.
The results support the notion that the more abstract a
paragraph, the more difficult it is to generate an image
to represent it in memory. With abstract material then,
the facilitative effect of imagery is not realized.
7Consistent with the results of Yuille and "aivio, that
abstractness and imagery are inversely related. Paivio and
Csapo (1969) proposed the following general model of
memory coding for concrete words, abstract words, and
pictures. Pictures are perceived spatially and thus are
primarilv imagery-coded. However, a secondary coding of
pictures— a verbal coding—is available to the decree that
a picture is unambiguous. In the case of words,
perception is verbal, thus initial verbal coding of both
abstract and concrete words is equallv likely, but the
availability of a secondary code~-an imagery code
--increases
in liklihood as concreteness increases.
Sachs (196a) reported evidence for a somewhat different
coding process. She presented subjects with passages
followed by a recognition task for a particular sentence
heard in the preceding passage. The test sentence was
either identical to the original, semanticallv changed
,
changed from active to passive voice or vice versa, or
formally changed in a way that did not alter the meaninp
.
When the test sentence was heard immediately after the
original, there was no significant difference in percent
Correct among the four types of test sentences. But as
the amount of interpolated material between the original
and the test sentences increased, recognition for semantic
changes did not significantly change, whereas recognition
for the other three types of changes declined considerablv
.
0These results suggest that the original form of a sentence
is only stored for a brief period of time (presumably until
comprehension occurs). Once the meaning or deep structure
is ascertained, the semantic interpretation is stored. The
two types of memory stores discussed up tc this point are
verbal storage and imagery storage. Sachs presents the
possibility of a third type of memory store, the nature
of which has not yet been discussed. Sachs suggested
that by syntactic processing^ deep structure is derived
from the surface structure of a sentence. A "semantic
interpretation" which is made from the deep structure is
in fact, "what is stored." It should be pointed out
that an imagery storage notion would provide an equally
viable explaination for Sachs' data, although imagery was
not discussed as an alternative explaination to a semantic
store
.
Begg (1971), using a recognition procedure similar to
that used by Sachs , found results compatible with Sachs 1
proposed coding process, and expanded her model to handle
imagery and retrieval processes. Begg presented several
hundred sentences to subjects, visually or auditorily.
After several intervening sentences . the sentences were
presented again, identical to the original or somewhat
changed, and the subjects made judg-ments of whether
the meaning and wording of the test sentences were old or
new. Begg's results indicated that the accuracy of meaning
9judgments declined as the number of intervening items
between the original and the test sentence (la*) increased.
The accuracy of meaning judgments however, was not
correlated with either lag or accuracy of meaning judgments.
On the basis of this evidence, Begg hypothesized a model
of concrete sentence memory in which the meaning of the
sentence is normally stored imaginally in lonn; term store,
and the actual words are available through reconstruction
from the image at retrieval.
Begg and Paivio (1969) affirmed the result that
semantic changes in concrete sentences are more readily
recognized than wording changes which retain the same meaning
but found that the reverse relationship prevailed when
abstract sentences were used. Subjects were presented
20 sets of five individual sentences each. Fifty sentences
were rated abstract. Fifty sentences were concrete. All
sentences were constructed similarily in the form, "The
(adjective) (noun) (past tense verb) a(n) (adjective) (noun).' ;
After hearing each set of five sentences, one of the five
was played back either identical to the original, semantical lv
changed or lexically changed. The task of the subject was
to recognize each test sentence as 'identical" to the
original or "changed" and then to indicate a confidence
rating. Subjects were randomly assigned to each independent
condition of the two by two design. The design included
abstract and concrete sentences and semantic and lexical
changes. The results indicated an interaction between
10
recognition of semantic changes and lexical changes for
abstract and concrete sentences. The nature of the inter-
action was that lexical changes were recognizee] at a
higher rate with abstract sentences, but the recognition
rate for semantic changes was higher with concrete sentences.
This is consistent with findings and interpretations of
Yuille and Paivio (1969) and Pompi and Lachman (1967) that
concrete sentences are primarily stored and coded non-
sequentially as images, whereas abstract sentences are
primarily stored and coded verbally in a sequential process.
Several interpretations of these results were proposed bv
Begg and Paivio. One interpretation is that imagina^
coding is more efficient in terms of reducing the number
of memory units. Another possible explanation was that
abstract sentences are treated as anomalous sentences.
One interpretation mentioned but discounted was that a
sentence can only be coded as an image after it has been
comprehended. Since, by their nature, abstract sentences
are more difficult to comprehend, they are likely to bo.
coded verbally in their original form. Begg and Paivio
concede that ebnereteness and comprehensibi lity night have been
somewhat correlated in their study. However, they argue
that the differential-comprehension arguement is not an
important factor in their study on the basis of the absence
of any main effect of sentence type. That is, looking at
sentence type irrespective of type of change, there was no
difference in recognition rate between abstract and concrete
sentences
.
11
The nature of this explanation is not clear. Because Begg
and Paivio do concede that concreteness and comprehensibility
may be correlated, it seems necessary to equate for
comprehension of abstract and concrete sentences before
attributing, results solely to level of concreteness.
12
RATIONAL FOR PROPOSED STUDY
Begg and Paivio's results, that lexical changes
are recognized at a higher rate with abstract sentences,
while the recognition rate for semantic changes is higher
with concrete sentences, warrent further investigation
to assess the role of comprehension in the interaction.
The finding that the exact wording of abstract sentences
is remembered significantly better than the meaning of
the same sentences, is of particular interest. The
present study attempted to insure comprehension of both
concrete and abstract sentences and then determine if
the same type of interaction between level of concreteness
and type of test still occurred. If the recognition
rates followed the same pattern as reported by Begg and
Paivio, that is, if memory for the exact wording of
abstract sentences exceeded memory for abstract sentence
meaning, then the notion of an imagery store would still
be viable. If however, the interaction did not result,
and the direction of the difference between rate of
recognition of wording and meaning changes was reversed
for abstract sentences, then two explanations might be
presented. One explanation is that comprehension
increased the "imagability " of the abstract sentences and
thus, as a result of the comprehension task, both types
of sentences were stored similarly. If this occurred,
13
they would be equally accessable in memory. A second
line of reasoning is that as a result of comprehension,
both types of sentences were in fact stored as semantic
units (as discussed by Sachs) rather than as images.
The results of the present study would not be able to
differentiate these two hypothesies.
The primary purpose of this study was to test the
hypothesis that an essential variable that determines
whether an idea is stored nonverbally and is coded as
Begg and Paivio suggested, in a way which is consistant
with the notion of imagery, is the degree to which that
idea has been comprehended. Using modifications of the
abstract and concrete sentences used by Beg? and Paivio,
a procedure experimentally comparable to that used bv
Begg and Paivio was employed. Each test session consisted
of an acquisition phase followed by a recognition phase.
During each of four acquisition phases, eight sentences
(half rated by subjects to be concrete, half abstract)
were presented via tape recording. Immediately after
each presentation set, a recognition test on those eight
sentences followed, again on tape. In each set of
recognition sentences, two sentences were semantically
changed from the original sentence; two involved lexical
changes only; four were identical to the originals.
In an attempt to insure comprehension by the experimental
group, a phenomenon previously found to be successful by
Rohwer (1966) was used. Rohwer found that embedding word
14
pairs in a sentence resulted in better recall of the
word pairs than simply presenting the pairs to be studied.
The linking sentences seemed to improve recall by providing
a context for the to-be-remembered material. Hyde and
Jenkins (1969) also reported a facilitation effect of
semantic manipulation of materials being learned by
subjects. In the present experiment, the to-be-remembered
materials were sentences. Context was provided by embedding
each sentence in a short paragraph which more specifically
indicated the meaning of that sentence.
In addition to the experimental group, two control
groups were run. One control group received the same
conditions as the experimental group with the deletion
of the comprehension task. This control allowed an
evaluation of the effect of the comprehension task. The
second control group did not receive the comprehension
task and in addition was presented sentences at the
same rate used by Begg and Paivio
, which is shorter than
the rate for the other two groups. This control was
designed to compare the results of the present experiment
with the results of Begg and Paivio.
As a result of encouraging comprehension of concrete
and abstract sentences, it was predicted that both types
of sentences would be stored similarily as images (suggested
by Begg and Paivio) or as semantic units (discussed by Sachs)
By either model, it was predicted that subjects would have
ready access to the meaning of sentences and would be able
to retrieve the exact wording only through reconstruction
from the stored meaning. A reversal in the direction of
the difference reported by Begg and Paivio between recognition
rates for lexical and semantic changes for abstract
sentences was thus expected. In this case, recognition
rates were expected to be higher for semantic changes
than for lexical changes for both abstract and concrete
sentences
.
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METHOD
Subjects
One hundred and twenty undergraduate students from
the University of Massachusetts served as subjects. They
were run in groups ranging in size from five to twenty
subjects. Prior to testing, subjects were informed only
that they were to participate in a verbal-memory task.
Materials
Sixteen abstract (A) and 16 concrete (C) sentences
were presented to subjects. A constant structure was
used for all sentences . This structure was, "The
(adjective) (noun) (past tense verb) a(n) (adjective)
(noun)." The sentences were modifications of those used
by Begg and Paivio. Words in the abstract and concrete
sentences were equated for frequency on the basis of
the Thorndike-Lorge (1944) word count. The imagery
level of the nouns was evaluated when possible , based on
the scale of Paivio, Yuille and Madigan (1968). On the
imagery scale of one to seven, the mean rating of
concrete sentences was three points higher than the
mean rating of abstract sentences.
Two types of changes were applied to the original
sentences to produce the test sentences. These changes
were semantic and lexical. The first type of transform,
semantic change, occurred when the subject -noun and the
object-noun were interchanged. The second type of
change was lexical and involved substituting a synonym
with the same frequency and imagery rating for the
subject
-noun and leaving the rest of the sentence unchanged.
An example of each type of change is included in Appendix B.
For each sentence, lexical changes and semantic changes
were equally plausible, although only one type of test
was given on each original sentence for a given subject.
This was determined in a pilot study in which subjects
rated all original sentences and semantically changed
and lexically changed transforms of each original sentence.
Sentences not unanamously rated as "sensible and plausible"
were rejected. This procedure prevented a possible response
bias toward any one type of response.
The list of 32 sentences was subdivided into four sets
of eight sentences. Within each set, four abstract and
four concrete sentences were randomly arranged with
the limitation that not more than two sentences of either
type could occur in sequence. Each set of eight sentences
was recorded on tape. A test session consisting of one
test on each of the sentences in the preceeding set was
recorded after each new set. Each test set of eight
sentences included two semantically changed sentences (S),
two lexically changed sentences (L), and four identical
sentences (I), arranged so that abstract and concrete
sentences were equally represented in each type of test.
As the task of the subject was to respond only "identical"
18
or "changed", the distribution of test types attempted to
avoid a response bias. This process of ordering sentences
and determining the type of test to be applied to each
sentence was carried out twice to arrive at different
sequences for Orde^ and Order,,
. Type of test (S, L, or I)
and type of sentence (A or C) were within subject variables,
so all test sentences from all subjects were included in
the analysis.
Design
Twenty subjects were randomly assigned to each condition
in a two by three factorial design with between-subj ect
s
variables of list order (C^ and 0 2 ) and treatment groups
(E, C-l and C 2 ). Additional within-subject variables of
type of test sentence (I, L, or S) and level of concreteness
of sentence (A or C) were included. Table 1 outlines the
design. Although all subjects heard the same 32 sentences,
these' sentences and the test type of each were arranged in two
random orders to determine the extent of order-dependence
in the outcome. The independent variable of particular
interest was type of treatment. The experimental group (E)
listened to a short paragraph, providing a context to each
test sentence. The test sentence was always the last
sentence in the paragraph. Each paragraph was presented
within a 15 second time interval. The first control
group (C-^) was allowed 15 seconds following each presented
19
Table 1
Experimental Design
Treatment r
E
Concreteness A C A c A c
Test Type
:
I L S I L S I L Co I L S I L C I L ct J
Orider.-L
Order
^
20
sentence to repeat and study the presented sentence. This
control allowed for a comparison of conditions within this
study. The second group (C^) had an inter-trial interval
of five seconds to repeat and study the presented sentence.
This condition was a control to allow a comparison of the
experimental group in this study to that of Begg and Paivio.
Procedure
Familiarization Task
Subjects were instructed before the familiarization
session as to the requirements of the task. The exact
instructions are included in Appendix B. A practice
set of six sentences was then presented after the
instructions, to familiarize the subjects with the
procedure and reduce any practice effect. The practice
sentences were obtained by the same procedure by which
the experimental sentences were arrived at . The
familiarization session consisted of two phases, an
acquisition phase followed by a recognition phase. In
the acquisition phase, four abstract and four concrete
sentences were presented on tape in a random order.
Immediately after the presentation of the last sentence
in the set, a recognition test on transforms of the
original sentences followed, again on tape. The
recognition sentences were either identical to the
21
original, semantically changed or lexically changed. The
task of the subject was to listen to each test sentence,
decide if the test sentence was identical to the
originally presented sentence, semantically changed, or
lexically changed, and mark the corresponding space on
the response protocol sheet. In addition, subjects were
asked to rate their confidence in making each response
on a five-point scale. Subjects had seven seconds to
respond to each test sentence.
In the acquisition phase, the sentences were recorded
at 15 second intervals for groups E and C-p and at five
second intervals for group C 2 . In the 15 second interval
between sentences
, the experimental group was instructed
to listen to the presented paragraph in which the test
sentence was always the last sentence. Experimental
subjects were encouraged to listen to the entire
paragraph, as it would help them to remember the last
sentence. The control groups were instructed to study
each sentence in the intervening interval.
Experimental Taak
The procedure in the experimental session was like
the procedure rehearsed in the practice session. Four
trial blocks, each consisting of an acquisition phase
with eight sentences, followed by a recognition test on
those eight sentences , were presented on tape in succession
without interruption.
77
RESULTS
The results of the study were analyzed with several
purposes in mind. First, to determine if the pattern of
results obtained in the Begg and Paivio experiment was
similar to that found in the present experiment. Second,
to assess the comparability of the two control groups
used in the study. And finally, to determine the effects
of embedding the experimental sentences within context-
paragraphs. In all of these comparisons the dependent
variable of primary interest was the probability of a correct
sentence identification (hit), defined as saying "changed"
when a test sentence was changed. In addition, an analysis
was performed on unchanged test items where a correct
identification was defined as saying "identical" for the
unchanged sentences. The independent variables were treatment
groups (E, C-, and C
2 )
, order of the presented sentences
(0-^ or 0« ) , concreteness of the sentences (A or C) and type
of test (Original, Meaning change, or Wroding chanpe).
Comparison with Begg and Paivio (1969)
Begg and Paivio reported that subjects had a
higher hit rate for wording changes than they had for
meaning changes when the sentences were abstract. When
the sentences were concrete
,
they had a higher hit rate
for meaning changes than they had for wording changes.
The control group in the present experiment provided
a test of the generalizability of the Begg and Paivio
results. It should be noted that the C
2 group was not a
direct replication of the Begg and Paivio results
because different stimulus sentences were used in the
two studies. and because the present study used a within-
subjects desipn, not a between-subiects design as used
by Bepp and Paivio.
The results from the Begg and Paivio study and the
C
2 p.roup from the present study are presented in Figure 1.
It is apparent from examining the figure that the pattern
of outcomes from the C
2 group in the present study is
different from the Begg and Paivio study in that there
was an effect for type of test sentence in the present
study. That is, the meaning chanp.es were recognized at
a higher rate than wording changes for both concrete and
abstract sentences. No such effect is present in the
Bepp and Paivio study. It is important to note, however,
that after removinp the main effect of type of test, the
magnitude of the interaction between recognition of meaninr
changes and wording changes for abstract and concrete
sentences was about the same for the two studies
under consideration. The procedure for this calculation
is specified in Appendix A. A significance test was not
possible because the error variance is not available
for Begp and Paivio' s study. But the data indicates that
24
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the magnitude of the interaction of interest was 2 8%
for Begg and Paivio and 25% in the present study.
Comparison of C 9 with Cj
An individual analysis of the two control groups
in this study was necessary prior to assessing the effect
of embedding the sentences within a paragraph context.
The reason for this is that the previously reported C
2
group differed from group E by two factors, presentation
time for each sentence and the context-paragraph treatment.
The C 1 group differed from group E only by the absence
of the context -paragraph treatment. Thus, an intermediate
analysis of C
2
and Ci was necessary to eliminate the
possibility that the increased sentence presentation
time was responsible for results of group E.
The results of the analysis of meaning and wording
test changes in groups C 2 and C;l are reported in Table 2 .
As can be seen in the table, there were significant main
effects for test type, where meaning changes were
recognized correctly more often than wording changes,
and order of presentation, where the probability of a
hit for C>2 exceeded that for 0-^. In addition to the
main effects, several significant interactions occurred.
The reliable concreteness x test type interaction was
in the direction that meaning changes were recognized
at a higher rate when the sentences were concrete , but
the probability of a hit for wording changes declined
26
Table 2
Analysis of Variance for Groups C
± and C 2 ,
Recognition Rate Data
Source of Variance
Groups (G)
Order (0)
Concreteness (C)
Test Type (T)
GO
GC
0C
GT
0T
CT
S(G0)
GOC
GOT
GCT
OCT '
SC(GO)
ST(GO)
GOCT
SCT(GO)
df MS
1 0070
1
. 5281
1
. 0945
1 3 . 0031
1
. 0 781
1
. 0383
1 .4500
1
. 0000
1 .0945
1 1. 1281
76
. 0520
1 .0031
1 .3445
1 .0031
1 .6570
76 .0568
76 .0439
1 . 0008
76 .0311
F
.14
10.16 **
1.66
6 8.41 **
. 83
.59
7.9 2 **
.00
2 .15
3 6.27 **
.05
7.85
.26
21.125 **
.03
* Significant at .05 a level
** Significant at .01 a level
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as concreteness increased. The order x concreteness
interaction reflects that the probability of a hit increased
with concreteness for 0
2
but decreased with concreteness
for 0 1 . Significant second-order interactions were
groups x order x test type and order x concreteness x
test type. The lack of significant groups, groups x
concreteness, groups x test type, and groups x concreteness
x test type effects
-are of particular relevance to the
intended function of group C2 . Extending the presentation
time from five seconds to 15 seconds did not significantly
alter any of the experimental effects of primary interest.
Comparison of Groups E and C
-^
The effect of the context
-paragraph treatment alone
can be evaluated on the basis of the comparison of groups
E and C^. These groups differed only by one factor
the presence or absence of the experimental treatment.
Table 2 presents the results of the analysis of
groups E and C± for wording and meaning test changes
.
The significant main effects were sentence concreteness,
in the direction that concrete sentences .were recognized
correctly with a higher probability than were abstract
sentences, and type of test sentence, where the probability
of a hit with meaning changes exceeded that for wording
changes. Other significant sources of variance were
Table 3
Analysis of Variance for Groups E and C
Recognition Rate Data
Source of Variance df ms
Groups (G) 1
.06 33 1 0 0
Order (0) 1
• 0781 x • o u
Concreteness (C) 1 1 7 R ft
• X / D O o . 9 3 *
Test Type (T) 1 1 5 . 9 1 * *
GO 1 0? Rl
.04
GC 1 0070
• lb
OC 1 4500 x u . u / ™ **
GT 1 0 3R 3• u o o o *7 Q
0T 1JL • U U 3 X
• Ub
CT 1 .3445• *j ~ ~ \j Q 111 ft &
S(G0) 76 .0520
PHP 1
. 0031 1 .07
GOT 1 .0500 1.02
GCT 1 .1758 4.66 *
OCT 1 . 2531 6.71 **
SC(GO) 76 .0447
ST(GO) 76 .0490
GOCT 1 .0781 1.9ft
SCT(GO) 76
. 0377
Significant at .05 a level
Significant at i01 a level
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order x eoncreteness
,
where the recognition rate increased
with increasing concreteness for 0
2
but decreased with
increasing concreteness for 01? and concreteness x test
type such that the hit rate for meaning test sentences
was directly related to concreteness while the hit rate
for wording test sentences was inversely related to
concreteness. Significant second-order interactions
were groups x concreteness x test type and order x concreteness
x test type. The effect of concreteness was more marked
with 0
2
than with 0
1 . The direction of significant
results, excluding those involving order, can be seen
in Figure 2. The remaining sources of variance were
nonsignificant
.
Begg and Paivio reported that the hit rate for wording
changed and meaning changed test sentences was differentially
affected by the level of concreteness of the sentences,
to the extent that wording changes were more often noticed
than meaning changes in abstract material and meaning
changes were more often noticed than wording changes in
concrete sentences. In an effort to determine if, in the
present study, embedding the sentences in a context-
paragraph had a differential effect on wording changed
and meaning changed test items, a seperate analysis of
variance was performed on the two types of test sentences
for groups E and C^. The treatment groups x concreteness
interaction was not significant for wording test
30
items, F(l,76)=l.ll, but was significant for meaning test
items, F(l,76)=5.97, p=.05. Referring to Figure 2, it
can be seen that embedding the sentences in a context-
paragraph did have a differential effect on hit rate
depending on the concreteness of the sentences. For
wording changed test sentences, the difference between
groups C
1 and E for abstract sentences was not significantly
different from the difference between the two groups for I
concrete sentences. For meaning changed test sentences,
there was no difference between the groups on concrete
sentences but a significant difference for abstract
sentences. This result can also be seen in the significant
main effect of concreteness for meaning changes,
F(l,76) = 15 . 87
,
p<.01, due to the higher hit rate for
concrete sentences than for abstract sentences, but a
lack of a concreteness main effect for wording changes,
F(1,76)<1. Figure 2 illustrates that for group E alone,
meaning changes were recognized at a higher rate than
wording changes at both levels of concreteness, and the
increase in recognition rate from abstract to concrete
sentences was similar for both types of tests. For group E,
the magnitude of the interaction between meaning and
wording changes for abstract and concrete sentences was
U%, compared with 2 8% reported by Begg and Paivio.
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Hit Rate for Original Test Sentences
The rate of correctly recognizing the original test
sentences for each of the three treatment groups was
analyzed separately. A significant source of variance
in the analysis of original test items was sentence
concreteness, FQ,ll"+)=27. 27
,
p<.01. The higher hit
rate for concrete sentences over abstract sentences
accounts for this effect. The significant groups x
concreteness interaction, F( 2 ,114) = 9
, 76
,
p<.01, is
illustrated in Figure 3. The main effect of order was
significant, F(l,114)=5. 93
,
p=.01, with obtaining a
higher hit rate than 0 2 .
Confidence Rating Data
In addition to the recognition data obtained in
the present study, the subjects also made confidence
ratings for their judgments of whether each test sentence
was an original or changed item. Analysis of the
confidence ratings in groups E and for wording change
and meaning change test items was of particular interest.
The results of the analysis of variance of the confidence
rating data were similar to the results of the analysis
of recognition data, with the exception that order was
a significant source of variance in the case of the
former, F ( 1 , 76 ) = 5 . 2 7
,
p<.05, but not in the case of the
32
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Figure 3. P(Hit) of original test
sentences as a function of the
concreteness of sentences.
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latter. The direction of this effect was that confidence
ratings for 0
2
exceeded ratings for 0^ The second-order
interaction of order x concreteness x test type was a
significant source of variance in the confidence data,
F(l,76)=6.71, ps.01, :
The three treatment groups were then analyzed together,
with the results being similar to those reported for E
and C
x alone. Order was not a significant source of
variance in the recognition data, F(l ,114)=2 . 03 , but was
significant in the confidence rating data, F( 1 ,114 ) = 4 . 92 ,
p<.05. The order x concreteness x test type interaction
was also significant intthe confidence data, F( 2 ,228 ) = 4 . 92
,
p< . 01
.
A finding consistant with the differences between
recognition rates noted in the previous section was the
significant main effect of test type when all three test
types of the three treatment groups were analyzed together,
F(2,228)=47.04, p<v01. On a five-point scale, unchanged
test items were rated with the least confidence (Mean=3.69),
wording changes were rated next in confidence (Mean=3.91),
and meaning changes were rated with the highest confidence
(Mean=4.17). A significant main effect of concreteness
was also obtained with concrete sentences rated with higher
confidence than abstract sentences, F ( 1 , 114 S
-
199 . 50
,
p<.01.
A surprising outcome was the nonsignif icance of treatment
groups, F<2,im><l. The confidence of subjects did not
vary systematically due to either extending the sentence
presentation duration or embedding the sentences in a
context-paragraph. The groups x concreteness x test type
interaction was also nonsignificant, FG+
, 22 8 ) = 2 . 2 8-.
Signal Dete cjtion Analysis
A signal detection analysis was performed on cell means
in an attempt to seperate response bias from sensitivity to
change. A value of d' was computed for each Proup for each
combination of treatment, order, sentence concreteness and
test type. This information is presented in Figure 4. In
each case d» is greater for meaning changes than for wording
changes. Furthermore, the interaction of test type x sentence
concreteness is observable in both control groups, but is
lacking in the
. experimental group. The nature of the inter-
action for the control groups is that the difference between
d« for meaning and wording changes is greater for concrete
sentences than for abstrace sentences. An additional point
worth noting is that d» does not appear to be order-dependent,
as previous analyses suggested.
Criterion or cutoff measures were computed for each group
for each combination of treatment group, order and sentence
concreteness. These measures are reported in Table 4 . The
notion that order did affect the decision criterion but did
not influence d' is supported by two findings. First, the
presence of a concreteness x test type interaction with group
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C
x
but no such interaction with
.roup c
2 . Second, the
cutoff increased with concreteness for Order
2 of Contro^
but decreased with concreteness for Order 2 of the
Experimental group.
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Table 4
Criterion Values for Groups Definedby Conditions of Treatment Groups,
Order and Sentence Concreteness*.
Treatment Groups
{Experj
" A 1
-mental
C
Cont
A
:rol..
C
1
'
Cont
A
rol 9
Order^
. 47 .64
.33 1.08
.67
C
1.23
Order
2 .64 . 39
. 58
. 81
.15
.67
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DISCUSSION
The major purpose of the present study was to examine
the effect on sentence recognition due to embedding abstract
and concrete sentences in a context
-paragraph
. Begg and
Paivio have argued that concrete sentences are stored
as spatial representations in memory, whereas abstract
sentences are .stored as verbal representations. The
results of their study tended to support this position
since subjects had better recognition for wording changes
when the sentences were abstract, and better recognition
for meaning changes when the sentences were concrete. An
alternative explaination for this outcome, which Begg and
Paivio discounted, was that the subjects in their study
had difficulty comprehending the abstract sentences and
therefore simply tried to remember the words making up
the sentences. The intent of the paragraph embedding in
the present study was to provide a context for the sentences
and therefore increase the comprehension of the sentences.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the context-
paragraph results, the generalizability of the Begg and
Paivio results will briefly be considered. The present
study included a control group designed to determine the
generalizability of Begg and Paivio 's results to this
study (C2). The similarily of the magnitude of the
39
test type x concreteness interactions for Begg and Paivio 's
results and results of group C
2
upholds the general
comparability of the two studies. In addition, the
analysis of groups C 2 and Cx together revealed no
significant effects due to groups. The extended presentation
duration for Cx had no significant effect on the magnitude
or direction of the results. Thus, a direct comparison
of groups and E was appropriate to lid evaluate the
effecttof providing a context-paragraph, and (2) compare
the results of this treatment effect to the results of
Begg and Paivio.
The purpose of the embedding treatment was to increase
the comprehension of abstract sentences. If increased
comprehension due to paragraph embedding did occur, meaning
changes of abstract sentences should be recognized at a
higher rate by group E than by group Ci. In other words,
for group E, the direction of the difference between rate
of recognition of wording and meaning changes would be
expected to be reversed from the Begg and Paivio results
for abstract sentences following the comprehension task.
The most noteworthy result of embedding sentences
in a context-paragraph, as can be seen in Figure 2, was
that the recognition rate for meaning changes for abstract
sentences was significantly increased as a result of the
comprehension task. The provided context, interpretable
as encouraging comprehension, served to reverse the
direction of the difference reported by Begg and Paivio
between recognition rates for lexical and semantic changes
for abstract and concrete sentences. The almost parallel
plots of group E for wording changes and meaning changes
for both concrete and abstract sentences is suggestive
of the notion that when comprehension of the sentences
occurs, the form of the storage units for the two types
of sentences ie similar. The similarity of storage of
abstract and concrete sentences following the comprehension
task, is further supported by the result that the recognition
rate for wording changes is practically the same for
abstract and concrete sentences for group E. Furthermore,
a differential effect on the recognition rate of embedding
sentences in a paragraph as opposed to simply presenting
the sentences was revealed in the seperate analyses of
variance of wording change and meaning change test
sentences for groups E and C^. This differential effect
was dependent upon the concreteness of the sentence. The
direction of this effect can be noted in Figure 2, where
the experimental treatment had its greatest effect on
raising the recognition rate for meaning changes of
abstract sentences. The increased recognition rate for
meaning changes of abstract sentences is of particular
interest to the present study
.
One possible explaination for these results is that
the nature of the storage unit is such that subi ects have
ready access to the meaning of the sentences, but retrieval
of exact wording only occurs through reconstruction from
the stored meaning. The dual-coding hypothesis avails
another viable model which provides an interpretation of
the process involved. The dual-coding interpretation
proposes that the meaning of a sentence is stored
seperately and independently from the wording of the
sentence (Paivio and Csapo
, 1969). The assumption of
Begg and Paivio that concrete but not abstract sentences
are amenable to unitization or coding which included the
"gist" of a sentence in a succinct unit, now seems
questionable. As a result of encouraging comprehension
of the sentences in the present study, the recognition
rate for meaning changes was practically the same for
abstract and concrete sentences. This suggests that
abstract sentences are in fact capable of being stored
in some unitized form similar to that utilized with
concrete sentences. The results of this fctudy imply
that comprehension is a condition necessary to unitized
storage of either concrete or abstract sentences. However,
abstract sentences are, per se
,
normally less comprehensible,
so the effect of the comprehension task on abstract
sentences in the present study was more dramatic than the
effect on concrete sentences. This would account for the
increased recognition rate for meaning changes in abstract
sentences, and the lack of an effect with concrete sentences.
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As noted in the Results section, a significant main
effect of test type occurred in the present study. Begg
and Paivio found no differences between wording and
meaning changes in their study. The superior recognition
rate for meaning changes over wording changes in the
present study may be accounted for by the fact that
different sentences were used in the two studies and the
development of the test sentences seems somewhat specific
to the original sentences used. The rules used to change
each original sentence to a wording changed or meaning
changed test sentence were identical to the rules used
by Begg and Paivio. The application of these rules, however,
is quite general such that it seems likely that the changes
would be of consistant difficulty only for a given type
of test change on a specific set of sentences. The result
of this type of rule is that although a given type of
test change is likely to be of consistant difficulty on
a specific set of sentences, exact matching of difficulty
should not be expected between the wording changed items
and the meaning changed items, nor between studies
utilizing different sentences. The fact that subjects
consistantly rated meaning changes with more confidence
than they rated wording changes implies that the two
types of test changes were not constructed to be of equal
difficulty in this study.
The signal detection analysis provided a possible
explaination for the significant effects due to order of
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presentation reported in the analysis of probability of a
hit data. The variability in the decision criterion,
despite the consistency in the corresponding d' values,
suggests that the order of presentation effects the
placement of the decision cutoff but does not effect the
actual sensitivity to changes in test items.
The results of analyzing the hit rate for original
test sentences seems consistant with the notion that once
comprehension has occurred, sentences are stored similarly
whether they are abstract or concrete. For group E, the
probability of a hit for abstract sentences was
practically the same as the probability of a hit for
concrete sentences (Figure 3). Over the other two
treatment groups however, the effect of concreteness was
significant. The result that unchanged items were rated
with the least confidence but received the second highest
recognition rate (next to meaning changes ) was surprising.
A comparison of the hit rate for responses to unchanged
items is not possible between the present study and that
of Begg and Paivio because Begg and Paivio did not analyze
the unchanged test sentences in their study.
The Confidence rating data provided support for
conclusions based on the recognition rate results. In
particular, the higher confidence rating of meaning
changed test sentences over wording changed test
sentences in congruous with the notion that the meaning
44
of a sentence is what is actually stored in memory and
retrieval of the exact wordin, is available only throuph
reconstruction from the stored meaning.
45 i
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SUMMARY
The results of the present study raise doubts about
the interpretation of the outcome of Be^g and Paivio's
study. Begg and Paivio proposed that sentence concreteness
was an important variable which determined how a sentence
is stored in memory. The present study investigated the
notion that providing a context for sentences increases
the comprehension of the sentences and resultingly
minimizes the effect of concreteness. As a result of
embedding the sentences in a context-paragraph, the
recognition rate for meaning changes of abstract sentences
was increased to the level of being nonsignificantly
different from the rate for concrete sentences.
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Appendix A
Magnitude of Effects of Specific
Sources of Variance
The procedure used to evaluate the magnitude of effects
of specific sources of variance is put forth in Section 5.3.2
of Myers, Fundamentals of Experimental Design
. This
procedure, as applied to the specific problem on page 2 3
of the present study is as follows:
The set of sample means is layed out in a table:
A
Meaning Test
Begg S Paivio
Wording Test Y.j. (7. j.-Y. .
.
)
0 u "7 C/ b 67.5 -3
C 80 67 73.5 + 3
Y. .k 70 71 Y. . .=70.5
(Y. .k-Y. .
.
)
-.5 + .5
Meaning Test
Control9
Wording Test Y
o. (Y • -Y )• J • • • •
A 80 73, 76 . 5 -.75
C 94 62 78.0 + .75
Y..k 87 67.5 Y =77.25
• • •
9.75 -9.75
The variability due to concreteness is indicated in the sum
of (Y • -Y ) over levels of concreteness. In the above
• j • • • •
sets of data, then, no main effect of concreteness is present
The variability due to type of test is indicated in the sum
over levels of tests of (7 v -7 ). No main effect of test
• • • • •
type is present in the above data sets. If after subtracting
from each cell mean, the variability due to concreteness
,
(7
.j."7
. ..
}
'
is subtracted from the cell mean at each level
of concreteness, and the variability due to test type,
(7
. .k"7
.
is subtracted from the cell means at each level
of test type, the result, in which there are no df for rows
or columns is the following:
Begg g Paivio
Meaning Wording
A -7.0 + 7.0
C + 7 . 0 -7.0
Control
Meaning Wording
A -6 .25 + 6.24
C + 6.25
-6.25
The entries in the above matricies are the estimates of the
concreteness x test type interaction. The fact that the
entries are not all zero indicates that variability remains
among the effects of treatment combinations even after
removing the variability due to the individual treatment
effects
.
The magnitude of the interactions reported above can
be computed based on an interpretation of an interaction as
"the difference of differences." In each case the difference
between meaning tests and wording tests on concrete sentences
is subtracted from the difference between meaning tests and
wording tests on abstract sentences. This method is as follows
(M
A
- wA ) -- <MC - wc ) .= Magnitude of Interaction
B £ P (60 - 75) - (80 -- 67) :: -28
C
2
(80 - 73) -- (94 -- 62) := -25
Because the direction of the interaction is the same, the sipns
provide no information necessary to the comparison.
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APPENDIX B
Instructions to Subjects
"The purpose of this experiment is to find out how
well people can remember what they have just listened to.
The experiment will take about one half an hour. You will
hear four trials of eight sentences each.
E; Each sentence you will be tested on will be embeddedin a short paragraph. The purpose of the paragraphis to give a context to the presented sentence so asto make it more meaningful to you. Each paragraph
will consist of three sentences. The last sentencem each paragraph is the one you will be tested onbut you should listen carefully to each sentence asit will help you remember the last sentence.
Cl£2 : In tne time interval between hearing sentences, you
should rehearse and study the sentences.
At the end of each set of eight sentences, you will hear
the word "test", and then the eight sentences will be
played back to you one at a time, seperated by ten seconds.
Sometimes it will be repeated with exactly the same words
as the original. But sometimes it will be changed in some
small way. Either the meaning of the sentence will be
changed or only theiwowds in the sentence will be changed.
For example, if you had heard 'The whiskered priest entered
an ornate temple,' and then 'The bearded priest entered an
ornate temple,' this would be a change in wording. If you
had heard 'The innocent occasion promoted a useless illusion,'
and then 'The useless occasion promoted an innocent illusion,'
this would be a change in the meaning. If the wards are
just as they were in the original sentence from the set,
put a black line through the word "Identical" on your
response sheet. If there is any change at all, mark a
black line through the word "Changed." Listen normally
to the sentences. They go too fast to try to memorize
anything, and anyway, you must attend to the meaning
fully, as well as to the words used. On your response
sheet there is also a place to mark how confident you
are in your judgment. Rating »i" is for very low confidence
you are making a complete guess. Rating "5" is for very
high confidence--you are absolutely sure you are right.
Circle one of the confidence ratings each time you make
a judgment. Try to use the five rating categories equally
often. Sometimes you will have to guess, but always be
sure to mark one alternative under "Identical" or "Changed"
and mark low confidence if you do have to puess. Do not be
disturbed at the difficult ones. Just listen normally, and
ludge the sentences on whether or not they sound right to
you,, even if you can not remember. Remember to pay close
attention to both the meaning of the sentences and the word:;
used in the sentences.
To familiarize you with the procedure, a practice set of
eight sentence's will be presented before the experimental
session. Remember, listen to the first eight sentences.
Then the next eight sentences will be test items.
Are there any questions before we begin?"
Appendix C
Presentation Sentences Used in the PresentStudy with Lexical and Semantic Test Sentences
Abstract Sentences
1. The final reason supplied the adequate motivation.
S ?Ef l™*,
con
? lde ratlon supplied the adequate motivation.. ihe final motivation supplied the adequate reason.
2. The solemn correlation encouraged an impressive service.L. Ihe solemn gathering encouraged an impressive service
o. Ihe solemn service encouraged an impressive congregation.
3. The foreign faith aroused an enduring interest.
L. he foreign belief aroused an enduring interest,b. Ihe foreign interest aroused an enduring faith.
?
'
ff'
he introductory statement promised a logical treatment.
I
;
.
Ihe introductory assertion promised a logical treatment,
o. The introductory treatment promised a logical statement.
b. The simple mechanism reflected an outdated techno] op v.
L. Ihe simple machinery reflected an outdated technology.
5. Ihe simple technology reflected an outdated mechanism.
6. The vague concern survived a renewed enthusiasm
.
L. The vague opinion survived a renewed enthusiasm.
S. The vague enthusiasm survived a renewed concern.
7. The complex review revealed an obiectivc position.
L. The complex summary revealed an objective position.
S. The complex position revealed an objective review.
8. The strange situation altered the accepted conclusion.
L. The strange circumstance altered the accepted conclusion.
S. The strange conclusion altered the accepted situation.
9. The unpleasant factor caused a dismal silence.
L. The unpleasant element caused a dismal silence.
S. The unpleasant silence caused a dismal factor.
10. The complicated proof explained a" limited formula.
L. The complicated calculation explained a limited formula.
S. The complicated formula explained a limited proof.
11. The original condition implied an essential balance.
L. The original provision implied an essential balance.
S. The original balance implied an essential condition.
5C
±1 . The
L. The
S. The
Ine
L. The
S. The
i ne
L. The
S. The
1 RJ-O • i ne
L. The
c 1 i lc
16. The
L. The
S. The
Concrete
1. The
L. The
S. The
2. The
L. The
S. The
3. The
L. The
S. The
4. The
L. The
S. The
5. The
L. The
S. The
6 . The
L. The
S. The
7. The
L. The
S. The
on
.
alternative version modified an established custom,
alternative copy modified an established custom.
version
.
— —
— —
—
-
- - —^ - X,. VJ. .
actual expression lacked a rational idea,
actual idea lacked a rational quotation.
a sleeping coyote
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QO • i ne
L. The
S. The
q
L. The
S. The
i ne
L. The
S. The
i ne
L. The
S. The
i ne
L. The
S. The
1
3
L. The
S. The
lilt:
L. The
S. The
15 Th^
T
Li • TV»^i ne
S. The
16 . The
L. The
S. The
e stalk
or
poor policeman called a sluggish scoundrel.
alert student pursued the talkative laborer.
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^textu^ Mj^t^
Wild animals seldom abuse territorial boundaries excentfor self defense. The need for food can explain many
P
???^
e
?
S1Ve aCts whlch would not otherwise occur THE HUNGRYBOAR ATTACKED A SLEEPING COYOTE.
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After much argueing
, the young child could still not
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could *ot Play in the mud. When his mother
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The king had never felt threatened by another man. notto mention a woman. The victorious queen tried to avoid him
on her trip through his kingdom, but he found a way to talkto her anyway. THE POMPOUS MONARCH CONFRONTED THE TRIUMPHANTQUEEN
.
The woodsman had died long ago in the middle of a severe
winter. Because the ground was too hard to bury him. hisbody was placed inside a huge rotted tree. THE HOLLOW TREE
HOUSED AN OLD TOMB.
The minister had always had a difficult time attracting
the town's people to church. The night of the assasinated
governor's funeral was an exception. THE SOLEMN CONGREGATION
ENCOURAGED AN IMPRESSIVE SERVICE.
The foreign-exchange student from India spoke at an
attentive high school assembly Wednesday. Much of her talk
revealed the fact that Buddhism was a major guiding force in
her life. THE FOREIGN FAITH AROUSED AN ENDURING INTEREST.
Because the convict frequently broke tools which he
borrowed from the prison shop, he often was blamed for others'
mistakes. A new prison aid found that using the man as a
scape-goat for his own short-sightedness was often profitable.
THE UNFAMILIAR HELPER ACCUSED A RECKLESS PRISONER.
The president was anxious to study the committee's review
of the welfare program. They had outlined their nroDosal to
him that morning. THE INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT PROMISED A
LOGICAL TREATMENT.
The first job of the Peace Corp engineer was to replace
the horse-driven well pump with a small electric pump. The
old type pump was too slow and was holding up irrigation of
the field. THE SIMPLE MECHANISM REFLECTED AN OUTDATED
TECHNOLOGY.
The jolly man was selling fruit at the market at the booth
usually occupied by the butcher. He only laughed when one
quiet but obviously disoriented shopper scurried around in
front of him. THE CAREFREE MERCHANT ANNOYED THE TIMID WOMAN.
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For months no one really took a stand on how thev feltabout environmental legislation. When a sanitary land-finarea was planned for the outskirts of the city? everyone wasup m arms. THE VAGUE CONCERN SURVIVED A RENEWED ENTHUSIASM
.
Driving along the turnpike is part icularily trying whenyou are stuck behind a slow car. A truck was anxious for acnance to pull into the passing lane. THE WHITE TRUCK PAccmA RICKETY AUTOMOBILE. PASSLD
*i* nJh € ^ ury. trifd . to express their feelings without showings g s of emotional involvement in the case. After a one houroration, they stated their decision. THE COMpL^X PEVTFWREVEALED AN OBJECTIVE POSITION. h* R IE
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The gentleman was noted for the compassion he revealedin his novels. That is why no one doubted that he would
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After weeks of debate, the equal-rights committee voted
unanamously m favor of a female president. Unexpectedly, the
only eligable female was hospitalized as a result of a serious
accident. THE STRANGE SITUATION ALTERED THE ACCEPTED
CONCLUSION.
The brawny man could not run and had only his strength
to defend himself with. The mad servant had not seen the
anvil in his hand. THE CRIPPLED FORGER KILLED THE TORTURED
SLAVE.
The excited ski team was suddenly quieted by the news
that one of their team-mates had fallen during the slalom
race. This diseaster would ruin any chance of a gold medal
for the team. THE UNPLEASANT FACTOR CAUSED A DISMAL SILENCE.
The couple was anxious to revisit the people they had
met the previous summer in London. When they pulled up to
their favorite restaurant, the friendly face they had
remembered was there to greet them. THE ENTHUSIASTIC
PROFESSOR WELCOMED THE FAMILIAR DOORMAN.
The statistics class was convinced that they were wasting
their time going through such a long proof. The formula
they were deriving would not even be very useful to any of
them. THE COMPLICATED PROOF EXPLAINED A* LIMITED FORMULA.
Any changes that were attempted in the factory threw the
whole system off. The old routine, with all of its faults,
still ran smoother than any innovative plan. THE ORIGINAL
CONDITION IMPLIED AN ESSENTIAL BALANCE.'
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The young girl was infatuated by her friend whoidly toward the sky. She sat silently by Mm and hesi'ttdto dxsturb haa. THE DELICATE MAIDEN WATCHED THE GREAT DREAMER
.
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Tbe ^jtfd States agreed to offer financial assistanceto Turkey if in turn Turkey would discourage exportation of
into XL ° U * ^ .The U ' S ' did n0t Want Horp smiled£a™ ^hlS countr,y and Turkey needed financial aid THE pftfn*PACT MADE AN APPROVED SOLUTION. RECENT
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WaS ^sensitive in his treatment ofot ers When a helpless derelict stumbled into him and
Forest mushrooms flourish in areas which receive a
moderate amount of sun light. Some underbrush which growsfaster than the mushrooms stifles the growth of mushroomsTHE OVERGROWN STALK SHADED A DELICATE MUSHROOM.
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dld not look forward to presenting the docWto the host. Although guests were often abrupt with him thebutler performed his job admirably. THE POLITE SERVANT
INTRODUCED AN INTOLERANT DOCTOR.
The importation laws reauired that jewelry being shipped
over the border be accounted for according to its weight "ahjewelry, regardless of its worth was considered on the basis
of the same criterion. THE REQUIRED DUTY INVOLVED A STANDARD
PAYMENT.
The teacher had promised the class a field trit> as a rewardfor their attendance. He remembered too late that he had
neglected to reserve a bus, and therefore had to cancel the
trip. THE RIDICULOUS MISTAKE NULLIFIED A PRIOR COMMITMENT.
The child was not aware of the value of the utensils
he had pulled out of the kitchen cabinet. He threw a home-
made paperweight toward the cabinet. THE SMOOTH ROCK STRUCK
A HEAVY POT.
The old man knew that he was considered to be a rather
shady character and never thought that he would have to rely
on civil authority for protection. One night the fellow lost
his way in the city and helplessly sought assistance. THE
POOR SCOUNDREL CALLED A SLUGGISH POLICEMAN.
The woman on the committee refused to pass the bill
until a phrase pertaining to woman's rights was included in
it. The committee had never heard such a demand, but was
forced to reword the bill. THE ALTERNATIVE VERSION MODIFIED
AN ESTABLISHED CUSTOM.
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The union member was curious as to the views of college
students on the Vietnam war. He was thrilled when he over-heard a co-ed avidly discussing the topic with a friend THEALERT LABORER PURSUED THE TALKATIVE STUDENT.
It was popular for people to quote Mark Twain in regardsto his statement on old age. As would be expected of thehumerous writer, his comments on old age reflected a make-believe sinility on his own part. THE ACTUAL QUOTATION LACKF^A RATIONAL IDEA.

